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HIS Article reviews significant cases during the Survey Period on
the subject of search and seizure, as well as confessions, from the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the Texas courts of appeals, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the United
States Supreme Court. The Article is intended as a summary of decisions
published during the Survey Period. The Article is not intended as an in-
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depth treatment of the subject matter and will not discuss all aspects of
each case cited.
I. TEXAS CASES
A. EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
During the Survey Period, several courts of appeals addressed the rec-
ognized exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.
The Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 9, of the Texas Constitu-
tion provide protection not against all searches and seizures, but only
against unreasonable searches and seizures.1 A search or seizure con-
ducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable, subject to a few specifi-
cally established and well-delineated exceptions. 2 Each of the cases
decided during the Survey Period examined or expanded the exceptions
recognized by Texas courts including the community-caretaking function,
the plain feel exception, warrantless searches of vehicles and administra-
tive searches.
1. Community-Caretaking Function
Courts have recognized various exceptions to the warrant requirement
including exigent circumstances, searches incident to arrest, and inven-
tory searches. In Ortega v. State, the San Antonio Court of Appeals was
presented with the question of whether to recognize the community-care-
taking function exception.
In Ortega, the defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated. He
entered a no-contest plea after the trial court denied his motion to sup-
press. A police officer observed the defendant driving at a very slow rate
of speed in the early hours of the morning. The officer monitored
Ortega's speed for a time and then began to follow his vehicle. When the
defendant's speed did not increase, the officer decided to stop Ortega to
see if he was having vehicle problems. After approaching the vehicle, the
officer observed that Ortega was intoxicated, administered a field sobri-
ety test and arrested him for DWI.
The defendant argued that the officer's reason for stopping him, (to see
whether he was in need of assistance) even if reasonable, did not justify
the stop. The State responded that the officer stopped Ortega based
upon a well-founded suspicion that he needed help and under the com-
munity-caretaking function exception the stop was constitutional. The
defendant urged the San Antonio court not to adopt the exception on the
basis that the Court of Criminal Appeals had been presented with several
opportunities to do so and had declined.
The court of appeals relied upon the following statement by the
Supreme Court in Cady v. Dombroski,3 to describe the community-care-
1. See Ortega v. State, 974 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, 1998, pet. filed).
2. See id. at 362.
3. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
[Vol. 52
CONFESSION, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE
taking function exception:
Local police officers, unlike federal officers, frequently investigate
vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and
engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as com-
munity caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, in-
vestigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of
criminal statute. 4
The San Antonio court then discussed the Fort Worth and Beaumont
opinions relying upon this exception.5 In McDonald v. State, the Fort
Worth court adopted the Cady rationale and held that when a police of-
ficer has a demonstrable reason to believe that a particular individual
may be unfit to drive for medical or other reasons, a temporary stop is
justified for the limited purpose of investigating that person's well-being. 6
The San Antonio court, while recognizing the disagreement among the
Texas courts of appeals,7 agreed with the public policy behind the excep-
tion and joined the Fort Worth and Beaumont courts. The court stated
that "This exception enables officers to fulfill their roles as protectors of
our general safety and welfare . ,"8 The court further held that evaluat-
ing the exception under an objective standard would ensure that Article
I, Section 9's reasonableness standard is met.9 Based upon the exception
and its own evaluation of the Ortega stop, the San Antonio court af-
firmed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. 10
2. Custodial Searches
During the Survey Period, the Houston Court of Appeals addressed an
issue of first impression in Texas courts: whether police may test the
clothing of a person lawfully arrested for one offense in order to investi-
gate his involvement in another." Finding that the defendant had no le-
gitimate expectation of privacy in his clothing while in custody, the
appeals court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. 12
In Oles, the defendant was detained for questioning as a witness to a
murder. During his detention, a routine NCIC search revealed an out-
standing warrant for a probation violation and he was arrested. The de-
fendant was not arrested in connection with the murder investigation.
After he surrendered his shoes and clothing, the Sheriff's Department-
without a warrant-sent the clothing, which had no visible bloodstains, to
4. Id. at 441.
5. See McDonald v. State, 759 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no pet.);
Cunningham v. State, 966 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, no pet. h.).
6. McDonald, 759 S.W.2d at 785. The Beaumont Court of Appeals followed the Mc-
Donald court's recognition of the exception in Cunningham v. State.
7. See Wright v. State, 959 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. granted) (refus-
ing to recognize the exception absent direction from the Court of Criminal Appeals).
8. Ortega, 974 S.W.2d at 364.
9. Id.
10. See id.
11. Oles v. State, 965 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. granted).
12. Id. at 642, 645.
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the Medical Examiner's Office for testing. Testing by a forensic serologist
revealed blood on the defendant's shoes. These bloodstains were later
matched to the victim's blood.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the search of his clothing was
illegal because it was in furtherance of an investigation for a different
offense than the one for which he was in custody. The appeals court re-
viewed the motion to suppress de novo per Guzman because it involved
questions of law based upon undisputed facts. 13
The Houston Court of Appeals first discussed the various exceptions to
the warrant requirement which have been recognized by the courts dur-
ing the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.' 4 Those excep-
tions include searches incident to custodial arrest and warrantless seizure
of personal items while a defendant is in custody.15 Both exceptions have
historically been justified by the need to search for weapons, instruments
of escape or further evidence of the particular offense.
The State argued that United States v. Edwards'6 authorized the seizure
and examination of Oles' clothing and shoes. The Houston court rejected
that reliance and distinguished the case because the seized clothing in
Edwards was material evidence in the crime for which the defendant was
arrested. 17 Instead, the Houston court was faced with the question of
whether the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights had been violated
when the clothes were examined for evidence of an unrelated crime.
Accordingly, the court evaluated whether defendant had a legitimate
expectation of privacy that the clothing would not be examined for evi-
dence of unrelated crimes while he was in custody. The test for legitimate
expectation of privacy requires the following evaluation: "(1) whether the
individual, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual (subjective) expecta-
tion of privacy and (2) whether the individual's subjective expectation of
privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as (objectively)
reasonable."18
Based upon these inquiries, the court held that the defendant had not
exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy because any such expecta-
tion of privacy disappeared when he was arrested. Additionally, he took
no actions to safeguard his clothing from testing, such as asking that it be
released to his family. 19 The court further held that even if defendant
had a subjective expectation, society was not prepared to recognize that
expectation. Based upon its finding that the defendant had not estab-
lished a legitimate expectation of privacy, the court upheld denial of the
13. Id. (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
14. See id. at 643.
15. See id.
16. Id. at 644; United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), overruled on other
grounds, United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
17. Oles, 965 S.W.2d at 644.
18. Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)).
19. Oles, 965 S.W.2d at 644.
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motion to suppress.20
3. Administrative Searches
Revisiting an opinion from last year's Survey Period, 21 the Austin
Court of Appeals re-examined its decision in Woods v. State,22 after an en
banc Texas Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case for proceed-
ings consistent with its opinion.
In Woods v. State,23 the defendant entered a courthouse carrying a gun.
Upon discovering she would be required to put her purse through the X-
ray machine, she began to exit the building. The security officer stopped
her and asked if he could be of assistance. She informed him that she was
going to the fifth floor, but needed to get something from her car. The
security guard would not allow her to leave until her purse had gone
through the X-ray machine. When the defendant left anyway, the secur-
ity guard brought her back inside the building to put her purse through
the X-ray machine. The defendant's loaded handgun was found in her
purse. At trial, the court denied the defendant's motion to suppress. The
Austin Court of Appeals held that the detention and search were not
supported by reasonable suspicion and reversed.24 After granting the
State's petition for discretionary review, the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals reversed and remanded.2 5
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted the petition in order to
address the continued use of the "as consistent with innocent activity as
with criminal activity" test.26 In its review of the Austin court's opinion,
the Court specifically rejected that test and expressly overruled the line of
Texas cases applying the rule.27
Analyzing the development of the doctrine of reasonable suspicion by
the Supreme Court, the Court noted that: "The lower standard of reason-
able suspicion is derived from the probable cause standard and applies
only to those brief detentions which fall short of being full-scale searches
and seizures."28
Quoting Terry v. Ohio,29 the Court observed that "a police officer may
stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer
has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal
activity 'may be afoot,' even if the officer lacks probable cause. '' 30 The
20. Id. at 645.
21. See Thomas M. Melsheimer & David Finn, Confession, Search and Seizure, 51
SMU L. REV. 839, 845-46 (1997).
22. Woods v. State, 933 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996), rev'd 956 S.W.2d 33
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997) [hereinafter Woods 1].
23. 956 S.W.2d at 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) [hereinafter Woods I1].
24. Woods 1, 933 S.W.2d at 725-26.
25. 956 S.W.2d at 33, 38.
26. Id. at 33-34.
27. Id. at 38 & n.3-5.
28. Id. at 35.
29. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
30. 956 S.W.2d at 35.
19991
SMU LAW REVIEW
Court went on to discuss the development of the "as consistent with inno-
cent activity as with criminal activity" test in Texas jurisprudence. 31 After
a discussion of the test and the inherent difficulty in its proper applica-
tion, the court opined that the test could not be harmonized with the rule
that a reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity justifies a
temporary stop or detention.32
The Court of Criminal Appeals, relying upon the Supreme Court opin-
ions in United States v. Sokolow 33 and United States v. Cortez, 34 formu-
lated the following test:
[T]he reasonableness of a temporary detention must be examined in
terms of the totality of the circumstances and will be justified when
the detaining officer has specific articulable facts, which taken to-
gether with rational inferences from those facts, lead him to conclude
that the person detained actually is, has been, or soon will be en-
gaged in criminal activity. 35
The Court of Criminal Appeals thereupon reversed and remanded the
case to the Austin Court of Appeals for further analysis in light of its
opinion.
In Woods III, the Austin Court of Appeals, after applying the new test
to the facts articulated above, held that the detention was proper and
affirmed the trial court. 36 The court stated that it did not understand the
new test to be satisfied when presented with any articulable facts to ra-
tionalize any suspicion. 37 Instead, "The articulable facts relied on by the
officer must support a reasonable suspicion that activity out of the ordi-
nary is occurring or has occurred, that the detainee is connected to the
unusual activity, and that the unusual activity is related to crime."'38 Con-
sequently, "if there are no facts that would make the conduct... anything
but innocuous, if there does not exist even a significant possibility that the
person ... is engaged in criminal conduct, a detention . . . is not constitu-
tionally warranted. '39
4. Plain Feel Exception
The Supreme Court has recognized various exceptions to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment including the "plain sight" excep-
tion and the "plain feel" exception. 40 Although the Texas Court of Crim-
inal Appeals has adopted the "plain sight" 41 exception, it has not
31. Id. at 35-6.
32. Id. at 36.
33. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
34. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
35. Woods II, 956 S.W.2d at 38.
36. Woods v. State, 970 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. ref'd.) [hereinafter
Woods 1111.
37. Id. at 773.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
41. See Clark v. State, 548 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
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addressed the analogous "plain feel" exception. The "plain feel" excep-
tion recognizes that contraband detected through the officer's sense of
touch during a pat-down search may be admissible.4 2 In Garcia v. State,
the Austin Court of Appeals joined the Houston, Dallas and Waco Courts
of Appeals 43 in recognizing the "plain feel" exception.44
In Garcia, officers stopped defendant's car because it matched the de-
scription of a vehicle involved in an armed robbery earlier in the evening.
After defendant exited the vehicle, the officer handcuffed him and per-
formed a pat-down search for weapons and contraband. During this
search, the officer identified a crack pipe in the defendant's pocket.
The defendant argued that the officer's search did not come within the
"plain feel" exception because he had to feel the object twice in order to
determine it was a crack pipe. The Austin court rejected the defendant's
argument that the officer had to manipulate the object based upon his
testimony that he felt something hard and grabbed on to it.45 The officer
testified that at the time he touched the top and bottom of the object he
knew it was a crack pipe based on his previous experience. Accordingly,
the Austin court found that because the character of the object was im-
mediately apparent when the officer touched the object, the confirming
touch did not exceed the scope of the "plain feel" exception. 46
5. Warrantless Searches of Vehicles
The protection of the Fourth Amendment varies in different settings
based upon the surrounding circumstances. 47 Individuals generally have
a lesser expectation of privacy in their cars as they travel along the public
highways.4 8 Consequently, if probable cause justifies the search of a law-
fully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle
and its contents that may conceal the object of the search. Warrantless
searches of vehicles are permissible so long as they are based upon prob-
able cause. During the Survey Period, an en banc panel of the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the continued viability of Texas'
requirement that a warrantless search of a car must be justified not only
by probable cause, but also exigent circumstances. 49
In State v. Guzman, a Department of Public Safety trooper searched
the defendant's vehicle after observing facts that created probable cause
the vehicle contained contraband. The trooper moved the truck to a
nearby service station. After removing the truck bed, the trooper found a
42. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 377.
43. See Graham v. State, 893 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no pet.); Strickland v.
State, 923 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no pet.); Campbell v. State,
864 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, pet. ref'd).
44. 967 S.W.2d 902, 906 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet. h.).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985).
48. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
49. See State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) [hereinafter Guzman
1999]
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bondo patch on the gas tank. Further search of the tank revealed thirty-
nine pounds of marijuana. The trial court held that the search violated
the Fourth Amendment because it exceeded the scope of the defendant's
consent. 51
On appeal, the State argued that the search was justified by the of-
ficer's determination of probable cause irrespective of any consent issues.
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that the search could not be
upheld because the warrantless search of an automobile requires both
probable cause and exigent circumstances. 5' Since the trooper lacked ex-
igent circumstances the search violated the Fourth Amendment. 52
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted the petition for discre-
tionary review to determine whether Texas law regarding the automobile
exception to the Fourth Amendment conflicted with Supreme Court
precedent. 53
In Guzman 1, the court of appeals relied upon Gauldin v. State54 and
Maldonado v. State55 which held that vehicles in police custody could not
be subject to warrantless searches based upon the automobile exception.
After a review of Supreme Court precedent, the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals found that the Texas cases directly conflicted with a line of cases
which culminated in United States v. Johns.56 In that case the Supreme
Court held that "A vehicle lawfully in police custody may be searched on
the basis of probable cause to believe that it contains contraband, and
there is no requirement of exigent circumstances to justify such a war-
rantless search." 57
When the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addresses issues involving
the United States Constitution, it is bound by Supreme Court prece-
dent.58 Accordingly, because the Texas case law directly conflicted with
the relevant precedent, the Texas requirement of exigent circumstances
had to be overruled. 59
6. Medical Records Searches
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals also addressed the issue of
whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the con-
tents of his medical records with regard to drug and alcohol testing. To
enjoy the protections of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must show
50. Id.
51. See State v. Guzman, 942 S.W.2d 41,45 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997) [herein-
after Guznan I].
52. Id.
53. Guzman If, 959 S.W.2d at 633. The court noted that whether the exigent circum-
stances requirement survived in the context of a challenge based upon Article 1, Section 9
of the Texas Constitution was not before the Court. Id. at 632, n.2.
54. 683 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
55. 528 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
56. 469 U.S. 478 (1985).
57. Id. at 484.
58. Guzman 1I, 959 S.W.2d at 633.
59. Id. at 634.
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not only that he has a subjective expectation of privacy, but also that his
expectation of privacy would be viewed as reasonable by society as a
whole.
In State v. Hardy,60 the defendant was involved in an automobile acci-
dent and sustained life-threatening injuries. As a result, he was "life
flighted" to a hospital where attendants drew blood to conduct blood al-
cohol tests for medical purposes. While the defendant was in the hospi-
tal, the DPS trooper who had investigated the accident obtained a grand
jury subpoena for any drug or alcohol information contained in the blood
tests. The records revealed the defendant's blood alcohol content to be
.239. Subsequently, prosecutors charged the defendant with misde-
meanor driving while intoxicated.
Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress the blood test results
based upon violations of his reasonable expectation of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment and the physician-patient privilege. The trial court
granted the motion to suppress on other grounds because the trooper had
violated the "defendant's right to a reasonable expectation of privacy."' 61
After the court of appeals reversed, the Court of Criminal Appeals
granted defendant's petition for discretionary review to evaluate the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in his blood tests.62
In determining whether society views an expectation of privacy as
"reasonable," the court must focus, under the Fourth Amendment, on
American society as a whole rather than a particular state or geographic
area.63 Drawing blood from a person's body implicates a fundamental
privacy interest recognized by society. 64 Recognizing this fundamental
interest, the court framed the issue as whether the government's acquisi-
tion of the written report of the blood tests infringed upon a societally-
recognized expectation of privacy. 65
Lacking direct guidance from the Supreme Court on the issue, the
Court of Criminal Appeals looked to analogous cases and the stated poli-
cies of other states. Looking first to the Supreme Court, the court noted
that the case of United States v. Miller addressed society's expectations
with regard to records held by a third party. 66 In Miller,6 7 the Supreme
Court held that a depositor possessed no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in his bank records. 68 The Court of Criminal Appeals also cited four
Texas courts of appeals opinions which had held that society does not
recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in medical records contain-
60. 963 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
61. Id.
62. Id at 517.
63. Id. at 523.
64. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989).
65. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d at 524.
66. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 440-43.
1999]
SMU LAW REVIEW
ing blood test results. 69 Despite these citations, the court conducted fur-
ther analysis because the issue must be reviewed based upon the policies
and expectations of American society as a whole.
An examination of the statutes and policies of other states related to
blood test results revealed that no consensus existed among the states
even in the context of searches of medical records for DWI cases. The
court examined cases from Pennsylvania, 70 Michigan, 71 Alabama, 72 and
Tennessee. 73 Based upon its review, the Court of Criminal Appeals fol-
lowed the Michigan and Alabama approach that focused on the unique
circumstances of the DWI-accident scenario.
From this narrow starting point, the court analyzed the defendant's rea-
sonable expectation of privacy. When a third party reveals confidential
information to a government official, an individual's privacy interests may
be compromised. 74 In Hardy, three separate invasions occurred which
could have implicated the defendant's expectation of privacy: (1) drawing
the blood; (2) removing and testing the blood sample; and (3) obtaining
the test results. 75 But in the first two instances, third-party agents had
already compromised defendant's expectation of privacy. Accordingly,
the court focused its analysis only on the third invasion, obtaining the test
results.
By tailoring the question so narrowly, the court easily found that soci-
ety refused to recognize a defendant's expectation of privacy in alcohol
and drug test results in his medical records in the context of a DWI acci-
dent. The court relied not only upon the cases discussed earlier, but also
on the implied consent policies state legislatures have enacted with re-
gard to traffic accidents. These policies provide that any person operat-
ing a motor vehicle has given consent to warrantless chemical testing.76
Indeed, such policies often allow officers to conduct a warrantless chemi-
cal test on unconscious individuals on the theory that consent has not
been withdrawn.77 Accordingly, the court held that whatever interests
society has in safeguarding the privacy of medical records, they are not
strong enough to require protection of blood alcohol results from tests
69. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d at 524 (citing Thurman v. State, 861 S.W.2d 96, (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no pet.); Corpus v. State, 931 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. App.-Austin), pet.
dism'd, improvidently granted, 962 S.W.2d 590, (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Clark v. State, 933
S.W.2d 332 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no pet.); Knapp v. State, 942 S.W.2d 176
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, no pet.)).
70. Commonwealth v. Riedel, 651 A.2d 135 (Pa. 1994) (reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy exists).
71. People v. Perlos, 462 N.W. 2d 310 (Mich. 1990) (no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy exists).
72. Tims v. State, 711 So. 2d 1118 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (no reasonable expectation
of privacy exists).
73. State v. Fears, 659 S.W.2d 370 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983), cert. denied 465 U.S. 1082
(1984) (no reasonable expectation of privacy exists).
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performed solely for medical purposes after a traffic accident.78
B. CONFESSIONS
1. Voluntary Nature of Confessions
During the Survey Period, an en banc panel of the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals addressed the issue of whether a confession given in
response to alleged promises by a federal agent would be considered in-
voluntary and therefore suppressed. In Henderson v. State,79 the defend-
ant argued that promises by federal agents induced her confession,
making it involuntary.
In Henderson, the FBI arrested the defendant in Kansas City, Missouri,
on a charge of kidnapping the infant son of a couple whom she worked
for as a baby-sitter. During the interview, the defendant offered to reveal
information regarding the child's location if she could remain in Missouri.
After this statement, the agent continued with the interrogation, but in-
formed the defendant that he could not make any bargains, deals or
promises. After a series of leading questions by the agent, the defendant
confessed to killing the infant and burying him near Waco.
The defendant offered various challenges to the admission of the con-
fession including that the agent used impermissible influence in violation
of article 38.21,80 that her due process rights were violated in obtaining
the confession8 l and that her confession was obtained in violation of the
Texas Constitution.82 The en banc panel dispensed with all of the defend-
ant's points of error by finding unequivocally that the FBI agent used
neither coercive tactics nor impermissible promises to obtain the
confession.8 3
In order to evaluate whether a promise constitutes an impermissible
inducement under article 38.21, the Court must determine if (1) the
promise was a positive one; "(2) made or sanctioned by someone in au-
thority and (3) of such an influential nature that it would cause a defend-
ant to speak untruthfully. '"84
The Court found that the defendant failed to show that a promise ever
existed. The defendant herself "initiated the idea of a 'deal' for staying in
78. Id.
79. 962 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Crim.'App. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 437 (1998).
80. Article 38.21 provides that: "A statement of an accused may be used in evidence
against him if it appears that the same was freely and voluntarily made without compulsion
or persuasion, under the rules hereafter prescribed." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
§ 38.21 (Vernon 1979).
81. Henderson, 962 S.W.2d at 565.
82. Id. The defendant also urged the court to adopt the federal test for voluntariness
of confessions as stated in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996). That test provides
a deferential review of the trial court's determination of historical facts and a de novo
review of the law's application to those facts. The Court of Criminal Appeals applied the
Ornelas test, but refused to decide that it was the correct standard. Id. at 564.
83. Id. at 564-65.
84. Id. at 564 (citing Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 86 (1997)).
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Missouri." 85 The Court refused to find any implied promises in the
agent's ambiguous statements, especially in light of his clear statement
that he was in no position to make bargains or deals. Absent such a
promise, the defendant's challenges to the voluntary nature of her confes-
sion failed to make the required showing for a statutory or constitutional
violation.
2. When is a Defendant in Custody
Police must advise the subject of a custodial interrogation of his right
against self-incrimination regardless of whether he has formally been ar-
rested.8 6 Statements which result from custodial interrogations may only
be admitted if a defendant received the admonitions and advisories codi-
fied at Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22. During the Sur-
vey Period, Texas courts analyzed the issue of when a defendant is in
custody for the purposes of requiring admonitions regarding his Mi-
randa87 rights.88 Both cases addressed the necessary level of restraint on
a defendant's freedom of movement to result in a custodial interrogation.
In Blanks v. State,89 a co-defendant contacted the Houston Police De-
partment to discuss a pending murder investigation. Officers met the de-
fendant and the co-defendant the next day at a local bar. At the officer's
request, the co-defendant agreed to provide a statement at the station.
Both defendants were taken to the station by the police. Upon arrival,
the co-defendant was interviewed by deputies who asked if he would give
a further statement at the Sheriff's Department. The co-defendant
agreed and volunteered that the defendant had been with him when he
last saw the victim. At that time, the defendant was also asked to give a
statement. Both defendants were transported to the Sheriff's Depart-
ment by deputies.
The defendant's first statement was recorded on a form entitled "Vol-
untary Statement" which did not contain any Miranda warnings. As a
result of inconsistencies in a polygraph test and continued interviews, the
defendant's recorded statement changed three times. During the third
statement, the investigators informed him that his co-defendant had ad-
mitted involvement in the murder. Thereupon, the defendant made oral
statements implicating himself in the murder.
At this time, the deputy testified, he read the defendant his Miranda
rights. The deputy also transferred the defendant's "Voluntary State-
ment" to the "Statement of Person in Custody" form which included Mi-
randa warnings. The transfer was accomplished by cutting the statement
from one form, pasting it on the Miranda form and photocopying it. The
85. Id.
86. Jordy v. State, 969 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet. h.) (cit-
ing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).
87. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
88. See Blanks v. State, 968 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, pet. ref'd);Jordy,
969 S.W.2d 528.
89. 968 S.W.2d 414.
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officer testified he then typed the rest of the confession on the Miranda
form.
On appeal, the defendant challenged the admission of the confession
because officers did not read him his Miranda rights prior to the oral
confession which was a result of a custodial interrogation. He based his
argument on his testimony regarding his subjective belief that he was not
free to leave and evidence that the entire statement had been cut and
photocopied, not just the first paragraph.
The Court began its analysis with the Supreme Court test stated in
Stansbury v. California,9" which provides: "A person is in custody only if,
under the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that his free-
dom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal
arrest." 91 The test is based upon objective circumstances, such as the fo-
cus of the investigation and whether probable cause exists to arrest, and
presupposes a reasonable innocent person.92 The subjective intent of po-
lice or the defendant's subjective belief will only become relevant if mani-
fested by words or actions of the officers.93
While the court agreed that an interrogation's tone may change as the
result of police conduct which escalates a consensual inquiry into a custo-
dial interrogation, 94 the court did not find that the failed polygraph test
created probable cause. 95 The court held that the consensual inquiry be-
came custodial not when Blanks failed the polygraph, but when his oral
statements created probable cause for his arrest and he became the inves-
tigation's foCUS. 96 The court also upheld the trial court's factual determi-
nations regarding the deputy's testimony concerning the timing of the
Miranda warnings. 97
Further, the Court rejected Blanks's claim that the "cut-and-copy" pro-
cedure was an illegal act. Blanks argued that an analysis by the Texas
Department of Public Safety concluded that the entire confession had
been copied, not simply the first paragraph. Blanks argued that the en-
tire confession was initially done on the Voluntary Statement form; con-
sequently, the Court should presume he was not Mirandized because the
form has no warnings.
The Court found that even if the deputy cut and copied the entire con-
fession onto the form with warnings, this fact did not overcome his testi-
mony that he stopped the interrogation and orally gave Blanks the
warnings.98 Although not approving the cut-and-copy procedure, the
Court deferred to the trial court's findings and conclusions that Blanks
90. 511 U.S. 318, 321-24 (1994).
91. Blanks, 968 S.W.2d at 419.
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 420 (citing Ussery v. State, 651 S.W.2d 767, 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)).






was warned and that he knowingly and intelligently waived his rights.99
In another case involving custodial interrogations,"1 ' the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals found that a defendant's response to the question,
"How much have you been drinking?" was the result of a custodial inter-
rogation and should not have been admitted by the trial court.' 01 The
defendant argued that admission of his statements made in response to
police questions near the scene of an accident should have been excluded
because the officer did not read him his Miranda rights. Defendant was
convicted of felony driving while intoxicated as the result of an accident.
During the investigation, the officer observed the defendant on foot near
the accident scene. When he approached defendant, he noticed a strong
odor of alcohol. The officer twice asked the defendant how much he had
to drink. Initially, the defendant lay down on the ground and said he
needed medical attention. The second time, defendant responded "A
lot." When the ambulance arrived, defendant refused to go to the hospi-
tal. At that time, the officer attempted to administer field sobriety tests.
When the defendant refused, he was arrested for public intoxication.
In reviewing the trial court's findings and conclusions on the admissi-
bility of the statement, the appeals court applied the recent decision of
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Guzman v. State, and the Supreme
Court opinion, Ornelas v. United States.102 Accordingly, since the issue
presented mixed questions of law and fact not turning on credibility and
demeanor determinations, the appeals court reviewed the decision de
novo and found that the trial court erred.10 3
The appeals court applied the Dowthitt'°4 test which provides that cus-
tody will be established if: "(1) an officer has probable cause to arrest a
suspect and does not tell him that he is free to leave; (2) the officer
manifests this knowledge to the suspect; and (3) a reasonable person in
the suspect's position would believe he is under restraint to the degree
associated with an arrest.110 5
99. Id.
100. Jordy v. State, 969 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet. h.).
101. Id. at 532.
102. Id. at 531-32. (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997);
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696-98 (1996)).
103. Jordy, at 531-32. The Guzman and Ornelas standards are applied by Texas courts
in determining reasonable suspicion and probable cause only for searches and seizures.
See supra note 87.
104. Dowthitt v. State, 913 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In Dowthitt, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Texas' historical four-part test used to determine
whether an individual is in custody. That test provided that the factors to be examined
included "(1) probable cause to arrest; (2) subjective intent of the police; (3) focus of the
investigation; and (4) subjective belief of the defendant." Id. at 254. The Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals held that based upon the Supreme Court case of Stansbury v. California, 1114
S. Ct. 1526 (1994), factors two and four were no longer necessary inquiries unless officials
reveal them through their own words or actions. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals expressly adopted the current test that "[tihe determination of custody must be made
on an ad hoc basis, after considering all of the (objective) circumstances." Dowthitt, 913
S.W.2d at 255.
105. Jordy, 969 S.W.2d at 532.
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The appeals court found that the officer had probable cause to arrest
because he had personally observed the defendant commit the offense of
public intoxication. The officer manifested that knowledge when he did
not tell the defendant he was free to leave, attempted to perform field
sobriety tests and asked him how much he had had to drink. Finally, the
Court held that a reasonable person in defendant's position would have
believed he was under restraint to the degree associated with an arrest.106
Based upon its analysis, the Court found that the trial court erred in
admitting the statement, "A lot." However, the Court went on to analyze
the error to determine whether or not it contributed to the conviction or
punishment. 10 7 In light of the overwhelming evidence supporting the
finding that the defendant was indeed intoxicated, the court held that the
admission of the statement was harmless error.108
3. Statements of Juveniles
Generally, the admission of a defendant's statements to law enforce-
ment officers is governed by Article 38.21. However, statements by
juveniles are controlled by Texas Family Code section 51.095, which
states, in pertinent part:
(a) [T]he statement of a child is admissible in evidence . . . if:
(A) the statement shows that the child has at some time before
the making of the statement received from a magistrate a
warning that:
(i) the child may remain silent and not make any state-
ment at all and that any statement that the child makes
may be used in evidence against the child;
(ii) the child has the right to have an attorney present to
advise the child either prior to any questioning or dur-
ing the questioning;
(iii) if the child is unable to employ an attorney, the child
has the right to have an attorney appointed to counsel
with the child before or during any interviews with
peace officers or attorneys representing the state; and
(iv) the child has the right to terminate the interview at any
time;
(B) and:
(i) the statement must be signed in the presence of a mag-
istrate by the child with no law enforcement officer or
prosecuting attorney present .... ; and
(C) the child knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives
these rights before and during the making of the statement
and signs the statement in the presence of a
magistrate .... 109
106. Id.
107. Id. at 532-33.
108. Id. at 533.
109. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.095 (Vernon Supp. 1999).
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In Rodriguez v. State,1  the Houston Court of Appeals addressed the
strictness with which section 51.095 must be applied.
In Rodriguez, the defendant, a 16-year-old student, was arrested at
school for allegedly threatening other students. While in custody, he was
questioned regarding a pending murder investigation. The officer gave
the defendant the required juvenile warnings and questioned him about
statements made by other witnesses. After the defendant orally con-
fessed, he was taken to a magistrate to receive the necessary warnings
again. The defendant then prepared a written statement with an officer
and later returned to sign the statement before the magistrate. At trial,
the court denied his motion to suppress.
On appeal, the defendant challenged the admissibility of the confession
on two points: (1) the written statement was tainted by the prior illegal
oral statement; and (2) the statement was signed outside the presence of
the magistrate when he initialed each paragraph while in the officer's
custody.
The appeals court, relying on Griffin v. State' 11 found that the illegality
of the initial oral statement to the investigator did not taint the subse-
quent written statement. Rather than find that the written confession was
tainted, the court evaluated the voluntariness of the defendant's written
confession based upon the totality of the circumstances.' 12 The court
found that the defendant received the required warnings before he gave
the written statement and that the magistrate admonished him again
prior to signing the statement.11 3
The defendant also attacked the confession's technical compliance with
TEX. FAM. CODE § 51.095. The defendant argued that he had signed the
confession outside the presence of a magistrate in violation of section
51.095 when he initialed each paragraph of the confession. The Court of
Appeals held that section 51.095 only requires that the written statement
be actually executed before the magistrate outside the presence of law
enforcement. Consequently, initialing the individual paragraphs prior to
execution before a magistrate would not render the confession
inadmissible.' 14
C. STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Application of Guzman v. State
In 1997, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals revised the standard of
review for evaluation of a trial court's determinations of probable cause
and reasonable suspicion. In Guzman v. State'1 5 the court stated that
110. Rodriguez v. State, 968 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.
h.).
111. 765 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
112. Rodriguez, 968 S.W.2d at 558.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 955 S.W. 2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
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generally a trial court's determination of probable cause is a question of
law to be reviewed de novo.116 The Guzman court provided the follow-
ing guidelines on the appropriate standard of review:
[A]s a general rule, the appellate courts . . . should afford almost
total deference to a trial court's determination of the historical
facts ... especially when the ... findings are based on an evaluation
of credibility and demeanor. [The same deference should be given]
to [a] trial court's rulings on [the] 'application of law to fact ques-
tions' . . . if the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on an
evaluation of credibility and demeanor. [Otherwise,] appellate courts
may review de novo 'mixed questions of law and fact' not falling
within this category. 1 7
During the Survey Period, the various courts of appeals were presented
with numerous opportunities to apply Guzman and explore the limits of
the new standard of review.1 18 In State v. Bradley, the Austin Court of
Appeals analyzed Guzman's application to the review of a trial court's
decision on the sufficiency of an affidavit supporting a search warrant. 1 9
In Bradley, the trial court seemingly applied a de novo review to ana-
lyze the sufficiency of the affidavit. Apparently, the trial court found that
it did not provide probable cause to issue the search warrant, because it
did not state when the affiant had obtained the included information. 20
The Austin court acknowledged that the Guzman opinion held that a
trial court's finding of probable cause should generally be reviewed de
novo.121 However, the court distinguished Guzman on the basis that it
reviewed a warrantless search and seizure, not a magistrate's determina-
tion of probable cause. 122 Based upon Guzman's reliance upon Ornelas
v. United States,12 3 which drew a careful distinction between the review of
magistrate's decision to issue a warrant and the review of a warrantless
search, the Austin court stated that Guzman did not overrule previous
holdings by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that a magistrate
judge's determination is not subject to de novo review.12 4
2. Review of the Adequacy of Search Warrant Descriptions
A search warrant must describe the target location in sufficient detail
that the officer can locate and distinguish it from other places in the com-
munity.12 5 However, minor discrepancies will not vitiate a warrant if it
116. Id. at 88-89.
117. Id. at 89. The Court expressly overruled Dubose v. State, 915 S.W.2d 493 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996), State v. Carter, 915 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Crim App. 1996), and Arcila v.
State, 834 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Id. at 90.
118. See State v. Bradley, 966 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet. h.) and
Smith v. State, 962 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. App.-Houston 1998, pet. ref'd)
119. Bradley, 966 S.W.2d 871.
120. Id. at 875.
121. Id. at 874.
122. Id.
123. 517 U.S. 690 (1996).
124. Bradley, 966 S.W.2d at 874.
125. Etchieson v. State, 574 S.W.2d 753, 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
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sufficiently describes the premises. 2 6 In Smith v. State, the Houston
Court of Appeals resolved a conflict in case authority regarding whether
a court may look outside the four corners of the search warrant to the
knowledge of the officer executing the warrant.127
In Smith, a confidential informant told a law enforcement officer that
the defendant sold cocaine from his house at 2400 Brooks Street. Based
upon the tip, the officer observed the informant make a controlled buy at
the location. The officer then executed an affidavit, obtained a search
warrant and executed the warrant the next day. The warrant contained
the following description: "2400 Brooks, Houston, Harris County,
Texas .... a one story white woodframed residence.... [It is] positioned
on the south side of Brooks facing north ... . [The] target residence is
located on the west side of the last residence positioned on the south side
of Brooks Street."' 28
Despite this description, trial testimony revealed that 2400 Brooks was
a nonexistent address and the directions given regarding its physical loca-
tion and appearance were inadequate. The defendant argued that the
inaccuracies caused the warrant to be constitutionally defective. While
the trial court found that these errors could have substantially impaired
an officer's ability to locate the correct target residence, it nonetheless
denied the motion to suppress based upon the executing officer's per-
sonal knowledge of the location.129
In its review of the trial court's decision, the Houston Court of Appeals
also recognized that a split in authority existed regarding the evidence
which may be evaluated to determine the sufficiency of a search war-
rant.13" Recent Texas courts of appeals decisions, relying on an older line
of Courts of Criminal Appeals cases, held that the description contained
in the warrant is constitutional or not based on the warrant itself, and
errors cannot be cured by reference to the executing officer's personal
knowledge. 13' In contrast, more recent Court of Criminal Appeals deci-
sions, and several courts of appeals and decisions of the federal courts of
appeals, hold that descriptive errors may be cured if the officer who exe-
cuted the warrant actually knew from his investigation the correct house
to search and searched only that house. 32
The Houston Court of Appeals evaluated both lines of cases and
elected to follow the authority which allows defective descriptions to be
cured if the executing officer had personal knowledge of the house to be
searched and searched that location. The court was persuaded that this
was the correct reasoning to follow for several reasons. For instance,
other circuit courts have adopted this same rationale including the
126. Id.
127. 962 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd).
128. Id. at 179.
129. Id. at 180-81 (citing United States v. Gordon, 901 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1990)).
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Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. Furthermore, this rule is apparently
followed in Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota and
South Dakota. 133 The Houston court stated that no Court of Criminal
Appeals decision prohibits consideration of the executing officer's per-
sonal knowledge of the target location nor does the Court of Criminal
Appeals require that the description be sufficient to allow "any" officer to
locate the premises.1 34 Additionally, the Houston court cited three Court
of Criminal Appeals cases that applied the rule and specifically consid-
ered the personal knowledge of the executing officers. 135 The Houston
court concluded that the rule acknowledges the reality that virtually all
search warrants are executed with the presence of officers who have
knowledge of the underlying investigation. 136 Furthermore, the realities
of the development of probable cause and issuance of search warrants
necessitates that any decision on the sufficiency of the description will
depend on evidence outside the warrant.137
II. FIFTH CIRCUIT AND SUPREME COURT CASES
A. KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE SEARCHES
The "knock and announce" rule requires that law enforcement officials
announce their presence and intent before entering a residence to exe-
cute a search warrant. 18 U.S.C. section 3109 requires that federal of-
ficers comply with this rule before executing a search warrant. 138 State
law enforcement searches are subject to the common law knock-and-an-
nounce principle which forms part of the Fourth Amendment's reasona-
bleness inquiry. 139 During the Survey Period, the Fifth Circuit addressed,
as a matter of first impression, the required length of time that officers
must wait before entering a residence after knocking and announcing
their presence.
In United States v. Jones,140 police officers executed a search warrant at
the defendant's residence. The officers knocked on the apartment door
and shouted, "Police. Search Warrant." After receiving no response af-
ter fifteen or twenty seconds, the officers entered the apartment. The
subsequent search revealed crack cocaine, ammunition and a revolver.
After the denial of his motion to suppress, the defendant was convicted of
possession of crack cocaine and other offenses. 141
133. See id. at 183.
134. Id. at 184.
135. Id. (citing Morales v. State, 640 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Aguirre v.
State, 109 Tex. Crim. 584, 7 S.W.2d 76 (1928); Bridges v. State, 574 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1978)).
136. Smith, 962 S.W.2d at 185.
137. Id.
138. See 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1985).





On appeal, the defendant argued that fifteen or twenty seconds was an
insufficient amount of time to wait before entering a residence. The de-
fendant contended that the short amount of time made the search unrea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The Fifth Circuit first noted that the federal statute did not apply to the
search at issue because the search was conducted by state officials. The
court observed that neither the Supreme Court nor a panel of the Fifth
Circuit had specifically addressed the length of time officers must wait
before entering. Although noting that other circuits had held that gener-
ally a delay of five seconds or less violated 18 U.S.C. section 3109, the
panel declined to create a bright-line standard for all knock-and-an-
nounce cases.142 Accordingly, the court evaluated the case based upon its
particular circumstances and held that in drug cases where destruction of
evidence may occur quickly or easily, fifteen to twenty seconds is long
enough to wait before making a forced entry.' 43
B. CO-DEFENDANT CONFESSIONs-ExPANSION OF THE BRUTON RULE
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the joint trial of co-
defendants routinely occurs absent a showing of prejudice by the defend-
ant.144 Often a co-defendant may have confessed or provided statements
to law enforcement officials which implicate not only himself, but also
another co-defendant who did not confess. In order to prevent the clear
prejudice which would result from the admission of a co-defendant's con-
fession, the Supreme Court created what is known as the Bruton rule.145
The Bruton rule forbids the use of a co-defendants' confession which im-
plicates another defendant in a joint trial.
In Gray v. Maryland,146 the Supreme Court evaluated the permissibil-
ity of using a redacted confession which substituted either a blank or the
word "deleted" for the defendant's name. Evaluating the practical effect
of admitting the confession, Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, ex-
panded the Bruton rule and held that the redacted confession should
have been excluded.' 47
In Gray, the defendant was charged with murder. A co-defendant gave
a confession in which he admitted to participating in the beating death
and implicated Gray. After denying the motion for separate trial, the
trial court admitted the co-defendant's redacted confession into evidence.
During testimony, the detective who read the confession into the record
said the word "deleted" or "deletion" whenever the defendant's name
appeared. After the redacted confession was read, the prosecutor asked
the detective, "[A]fter [he] gave you that information, you subsequently
142. Id. at 361.
143. Id. at 361-62.
144. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 14.
145. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
146. 118 S. Ct. 1151 (1998).
147. Id.
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were able to arrest . . . [the defendant]?" The officer responded
affirmatively. 148
The court evaluated the admission of the redacted statement under
Bruton and Richardson v. Marsh149 in order to determine whether the
admission of the redacted confession was constitutionally impermissible.
Richardson v. Marsh, unlike Bruton, involved a redacted confession.
However, in Richardson, the redaction was such that the confession de-
leted all references to the co-defendant while preserving the integrity of
the confession. In other words, the confession, as read, made sense while
omitting all reference or suggestion that another person was involved in
the crime. In that case, the court held that the confession was outside the
scope of Bruton, and was admissible with appropriate limiting
instructions.
Justice Breyer held that use of the confession at issue in Gray was im-
permissible because the mode of redaction allowed the jury to make the
inference that the defendant's name had been deleted from the state-
ment. 150 Redactions using symbols or deletions leave statements that,
"considered as a class, so closely resemble Bruton's unredacted state-
ments" that the law requires that they be excluded. 151 Additionally, un-
less a co-defendant's confession may be altered in such a way as to
remove all reference or indications of another's presence, that confession
must be excluded in a joint trial.
C. EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN PAROLE PROCEEDINGS
The Exclusionary Rule is a judicially created means of deterring illegal
searches and seizures. 152 Consequently, the rule does not forbid the ad-
mission of illegally obtained evidence in all proceedings or against all per-
sons.153 Further, because the rule is not constitutionally mandated, it
should only be applied when its deterrence benefits outweigh the sub-
stantial social costs. 1 54
In Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 55 the Supreme
Court confronted the question of whether the Exclusionary Rule should
be expanded to parole proceedings. In Scott, the defendant, a convicted
felon released on parole, was sentenced to thirty-six months backtime by
the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole for violation of his pa-
role conditions. Based upon information that the defendant had violated
the conditions of his release, parole officers arrested him. Before being
taken to jail, the defendant gave the officers the keys to his home. The
officers entered the residence and waited for the defendant's mother to
148. Id.
149. 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
150. Gray, 118 S. Ct. at 1155.
151. Id.
152. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
153. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
154. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
155. 118 S. Ct. 2014 (1998).
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return. At that time, they searched defendant's room without requesting
or receiving consent to do so. The defendant moved to exclude the evi-
dence found in the search of his room at the parole violation hearing.
Although the Parole Board admitted the evidence, Pennsylvania state
courts held that the evidence should have been excluded.
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, held that the Exclusionary
Rule did not apply to parole revocation proceedings. 56 In so holding,
the court extended its line of cases declining to expand the Exclusionary
Rule outside the criminal trial context. 157 The court cited three past
opinions which refused to extend the rule including United States v.
Janis,158 United States v. Calandra,159 and INS v. Lopez-Mendoza.160
In Scott, the court re-emphasized its previous reasoning that the Exclu-
sionary Rule should be limited in its application due to its significant so-
cial costs and detrimental effect on the truth finding process.' 6' The court
found that application of the Exclusionary Rule in this context would hin-
der the functions of state parole systems and alter the flexible, adminis-
trative nature of the proceedings. Additionally, the rule would have
limited deterrence benefits in parole hearings. 62
156. Id. at 2019-20.
157. Id.
158. 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (refusing to extend Exclusionary Rule to grand jury
proceedings).
159. 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (refusing to extend rule to civil tax proceedings).
160. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (refusing to extend Exclusionary Rule to deportation
proceedings).
161. Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2020.
162. Id. at 2021.
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